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abstract
This article shows that while the impact of crime victimization on 
support for democracy is sensitive to question wording, the influ-
ence of fear of crime on this attitude is consistent and immune 
to measurement effects. We construe this as evidence that fear of 
crime has greater attitudinal consequences for democratic support 
than crime victimization. We show that fear of crime is affected 
by actual individual and contextual levels of crime victimization as 
well as evaluations of regime performance. Finally, and consistent 
with the affective intelligence literature, we find that crime fails to 
activate people’s surveillance systems in countries that exhibit very 
low levels of it (typically, where less than 10% of respondents re-
port to have been victims of crime). It is only in countries that have 
significant crime victimization where fear of it becomes a factor 
affecting support for democracy. 
Keywords: fear of crime - support for democracy - emotion and 
politics - political attitudes - multilevel analysis
resumen
Este artículo muestra que el impacto de la victimización por crimen 
en el apoyo a la democracia está condicionado por los efectos de 
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fraseo (es decir, por la manera como se mide este apoyo). Sin em-
bargo, la influencia del miedo al crimen en el apoyo a la democracia 
es consistente e inmune a los efectos de medición. Lo anterior su-
giere que el miedo al crimen tiene una mayor consecuencia actitu-
dinal en este apoyo que la victimización por crimen. Mostramos que 
el miedo al crimen está afectado por niveles de victimización indivi-
dual y contextual así como por evaluaciones del desempeño del ré-
gimen político. Finalmente, y consistente con la literatura sobre la 
inteligencia afectiva, encontramos que el crimen no activa los sis-
temas de vigilancia de la gente en países donde los niveles de cri-
minalidad son muy bajos (típicamente, donde menos del 10% de los 
entrevistados asegura haber sido víctima de un acto delincuencial). 
Es solo en países donde existen altos niveles de victimización donde 
el miedo al crimen se convierte en un factor que afecta el apoyo a 
la democracia. A un nivel más teórico, el presente trabajo resalta la 
importancia de las emociones en la formación de actitudes políticas. 
Palabras clave: miedo al crimen - apoyo a la democracia - 
emociones y política - actitudes políticas - análisis multinivel
The Fearful Citizen:  
Crime and Support for democracy in latin america
The provision of public safety is one of the core functions of 
government. In many places, however, governments fail at 
this basic task. In Latin America, in particular, the state has 
been largely incapable of providing citizen security (Casas-
Zamora, 2013; Costa, 2012; Programa de las Naciones Uni-
das para el Desarrollo-PNUD, 2013). Dammert (2013:79), cit-
ing statistics from the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), reports that half of the top twenty countries 
with the highest homicide rates in the world are located in 
Latin America. Less violent crime is also pervasive (PNUD, 
2013). The reasons for this rise remain highly contested, as 
many interpretations have been advanced: rapid economic 
change, rapid urbanization, the adoption of neoliberal eco-
nomic policies, the legacies of state violence, and the de-
mands of transnational criminal networks, among others 
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(Casas-Zamora, 2013; Chillier and Varela, 2009; Cruz, 2011; 
Dammert, 2013; LaFree and Tseloni, 2006; Pearce, 2010; 
Portes and Roberts, 2005). 
This crime wave has fostered a deep sense of fear among 
Latin American populations, particularly among women (Ca-
sas-Zamora, 2013:31; Dammert, 2012). Not surprisingly, citi-
zens in many places cite crime as the most important issue 
facing their countries.3 Nevertheless, the political conse-
quences of the feelings of insecurity in Latin America have 
not been thoroughly explored. While it is usually used as 
another predictor in studies that try to determine the impact 
of crime on support for democracy, it is not generally given 
specific attention and therefore it is not properly theorized. 
The main question we address here is whether the 
widespread delinquency in Latin America leads citizens to 
reject the idea of democracy. Answering this question re-
quires revisiting the larger issue of the attitudinal bases of 
support for democracy in transitional societies. The study 
of mass support for democracy is important because, as In-
glehart (2003) has demonstrated, this support is correlated 
with actual levels of democracy. In other words, individu-
al support for democracy tends to be weaker in countries 
that exhibit lower levels of democracy. But as Casas-Zamora 
(2013:11) and Cruz (2011), among others, have noted, crime 
itself can be a product of democracy’s deficiencies in ad-
dressing the needs of significant segments of the popu-
lation and dealing with the legacies of authoritarian rule. 
Crime can also lead many to reject rule of law and embrace 
police tactics that can foster the violation of human rights 
(Malone, 2010-2011; Malone, 2012). In this sense, crime can 
further undermine the very conditions that are necessary 
for stronger citizen endorsement of democracy.
The early literature on mass support for democracy de-
bated whether this attitude was anchored on performance 
3 In 12 of the 18 countries surveyed by the Latinobarómetro in 2010, crime was 
cited as the most important issue facing the country (Costa 2012:7).
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considerations or deep-seated values (Bratton and Mattes, 
2001; Gibson, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 2003; Mattes 
and Bratton, 2007; Mishler and Rose, 1996). Today, at least 
when one discusses the Latin American case, one cannot 
examine the bases of support for democracy without ac-
counting for the impact of citizen insecurity on this attitude. 
To the extent that crime elicits strong negative emotions, 
the crisis of citizen insecurity in Latin America also allows 
us to theorize one dimension that was virtually absent in 
early treatments of support for democracy, namely the role 
of emotions. Disputing the idea that rational calculations 
and cognitive effects are the primary drivers of political at-
titudes, some public opinion scholars argue that emotions 
influence which factors are judged and how much weight 
they are given when individuals make political decisions 
(Demertzis, 2013; Marcus, 2000; Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, 
and MacKuen, 2007; Rusting, 1998). In this paper we show 
that fear of crime—measured by feelings of insecurity—has a 
consistent impact in the levels of support for democracy. We 
argue that fear of crime should not be construed as an “ir-
rational emotion” for it is driven—as shown below—by both 
actual experiences with crime and assessments of regime 
performance. But fear of crime taps an emotional response 
that is seldom explored in the literature of mass support for 
democracy. We find here that fear of crime has no impact on 
attitudes towards democracy in countries that exhibit very 
low crime victimization (typically, less than 10% of self-re-
ported victimization), but it does in countries where self-re-
ported crime victimization rates exceed 15%. This finding 
cannot easily be explained if one sees fear of crime as on-
ly expressing performance evaluations. But if one construes 
this fear as also an emotional response, then standard the-
ories of emotions and politics would provide an explanation 
for this discrepancy. 
Existing research on the role of crime on mass attitudes 
towards democracy in Latin America tends to show that 
while the impact of feelings of insecurity on democratic at-
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titudes is strong and consistent, the effect of self-report-
ed crime victimization on this support is more contested. 
For instance, when support for democracy is defined as re-
gime preference,4 crime victimization seems to have no ef-
fect on this choice (Ceobanu, Wood, and Ribeiro, 2010:72-
73; Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010:459; Pérez, 2003-4:644, 
but see Bateson, 2010, who does find a significant asso-
ciation). When democracy is measured as agreement with 
its Churchillian definition,5 some find that being a victim of 
crime has no effect on this attitude (Bateson, 2010; Pérez, 
2011) but others do find a significant impact of crime vic-
timization on support for democracy (Casas-Zamora, 2013). 
Crime victimization has also been found to be a significant 
predictor of satisfaction with democracy (Ceobanu, Wood, 
and Ribeiro, 2010; Fernandez and Kuenzi, 2010), political 
legitimacy (Carreras, 2013), increased political participation 
(Bateson, 2012), and support for rule of law (Malone, 2010). 
We revisit this issue and show here that while the impact of 
crime victimization on support for democracy is indeed sen-
sitive to question wording (i.e. how support for democracy is 
measured), fear of crime is not. We confirm previous studies 
that show an association between fear of crime and dem-
ocratic attitudes, and we confirm existing literature (Dam-
mert, 2012; Garofalo, 1979; Rotker, 2002; Skogan, 1987) 
by showing that this fear is driven by actual victimization, 
both individual and contextual (city or municipality levels 
of crime), as well as by assessments of the political system. 
Moreover, we show that fear of crime has a greater impact 
on support for democracy in countries with significant levels 
of self-reported crime victimization than in countries that 
exhibit very low degrees of crime victimization. Thus, we 
argue that while crime victimization per se might not have 
a consistently significant direct influence on support for de-
4 “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.” Full wording of 
the question is provided later in the text.
5 “Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of govern-
ment. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?”
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mocracy (or at least in some ways of measuring it), it is a 
significant driver of feelings of insecurity, and therefore its 
impact on support for democracy is extremely important. 
In this paper we theorize the relationship between fear 
of crime (a negative emotion) and support for democracy by 
arguing that significant levels of crime victimization trigger 
a surveillance system that leads people to assign a signifi-
cant weight to this fear when assessing political choices. 
We do not dispute—and in fact show—that fear of crime is 
also driven by assessments of the larger political regime. 
But we do choose to stress in this article the emotional con-
tent of this fear for three main reasons. First, the literature 
has already explored the connection between performance 
evaluations and support for democracy. Second, very little 
work exists on the impact of emotions and related mecha-
nisms on support for democracy. Finally, relying on an emo-
tion-driven explanation, we can make sense of the finding 
that fear of crime does not have a significant impact on sup-
port for democracy in countries that exhibit very low levels 
of self-reported crime victimization. 
The data analysis relies on a multilevel mixed-effects re-
search design that includes country- and individual-level 
effects on support for democracy. Like previous multilevel 
analyses (Ceobanu, Wood, and Ribeiro, 2010; Fernandez and 
Kuenzi, 2010), we include country-level variables that ex-
amine the impact of economic development and homicide 
rates on support for democracy. Given that we identify some 
question-wording effects in this support, we utilize two dif-
ferent ways of measuring support for democracy. We control 
for the influence of other variables traditionally associated 
with the study of this support, such as economic and politi-
cal performance, political efficacy, and interpersonal trust. 
We use a comprehensive data set from the 2012 round of the 
America Barometer to analyze these associations.6 
6 Data come from the America Barometer survey conducted in 2012 by the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University. In all the 23 coun-
tries included in this analysis (Belize, Canada, and the United States were not 
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The role of emotions in politics
Although there is a long intellectual tradition that links emo-
tions with politics (Elster, 1999), it is only relatively recently 
that the role of emotions in determining political attitudes 
has received the attention it deserves (Redlawsk, 2006). 
Those who study the impact of emotions on political choices 
tend to approach this study from two different perspectives: 
one that examines how emotions interact with personality 
traits and another that studies how people experience dif-
ferent emotional reactions to contemporary events (Marcus, 
2000). This paper fits into the second approach, for it seeks 
to understand how emotional responses to the current crime 
wave affect attitudes towards democracy.
In a path breaking study, Marcus, Neuman, and Mac 
Kuen (2000) argue that ordinary people possess two emo-
tional systems: a dispositional one that processes people’s 
normal reactions to events and a surveillance system that 
manages their attention to new and threatening conditions. 
In this approach, which came to be known as “affective in-
telligence theory” (MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, and Keele, 
2007; Marcus, 2003; Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman, 2011), 
the dispositional system relies on emotions such as enthu-
siasm and aversion whereas the surveillance system is acti-
vated by anxiety, fear, or uncertainty, “to signal that some-
thing about the world is not routine and that conscious 
attention is necessary” (Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman, 
2011:324). When people deal with familiar conditions, they 
pay less explicit attention to their environment and tend to 
rely on existing predispositions to make political choices. In 
the presence of anxiety, people pay close attention to the 
environment and give more weight to negative information 
(Cassino and Lodge, 2007:106). More importantly, emo-
included), nationally representative surveys of voting age adults were con-
ducted using a multi-stage probabilistic design and stratified by major regions 
of the country, size of municipality and urban and rural areas. For a full de-
scription of the methodology see http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/ab2012/
AB-2012-Tech-Info-12.18.12.pdf
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tions can be used directly as information. Thus, “a nega-
tive mood can be used as a factor in deciding that an object 
is bad, regardless of whether the mood has anything to do 
with the object” (Cassino and Lodge, 2007:106). This view 
is endorsed by Brader (2011:202), who argues that nega-
tive feelings lead to negative judgments. All things being 
equal, anxiety triggers a desire for political change (Nar-
dulli and Kuklinski, 2007:316). Based on these insights, we 
expect that people who become anxious because of crime 
would blame the existing political regime for it and reject 
democracy accordingly. In fact, the negative political con-
sequences of crime would affect any political regime. In this 
paper we focus on the impact on crime on support for de-
mocracy because the overwhelming majority of Latin Amer-
ican governments claim to be democracies, and are gener-
ally perceived to be so, even if only of the electoral kind or 
with serious flaws (PNUD, 2004:78). To the extent that Lat-
in American governments claim to be democracies, people 
fearful of crime will tend to blame their regime for their in-
ability to deal with the source of their fears and therefore 
will tend to reject it. 
There is an additional mechanism that links emotions 
and support/rejection of democracy. Fear focuses a person’s 
attention on the potential threat and, as Brader (2011:195) 
writes, “directs attention selectively toward the threat and 
ways of removing it.” Accordingly, fearful and anxious citi-
zens are more likely to pay greater attention to—and there-
fore be more persuaded by—proposals that offer “quick fixes” 
to the crime situation, such as those usually associated with 
authoritarian iron-fist policies. We agree with Malone’s 
(2012:17) contention that many citizens feel they are in a 
“security trap,” which leads to “increasing public support 
for undemocratic measures.” In other words, fear of crime 
makes citizens more amenable to antidemocratic messages. 
What is important here is that crime triggers an emo-
tional response that has political consequences. Under 
normal conditions, when citizens are engaging only their 
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dispositional emotional systems, crime can be seen as a 
random occurrence, an event that was perhaps triggered by 
the individual’s own carelessness, with no political conse-
quences. In a context where crime is prevalent, as it is the 
case of most of Latin America today, people’s surveillance 
emotional system is activated and—as a consequence—fear 
of crime becomes an important piece of information in eval-
uating the political regime.
Existing work on the political consequences of fear and 
anxiety argues that these emotions prompt citizens to re-
consider their political predispositions (Brader, 2011:205). 
Fear can also lead to a “securitization” of political process-
es, a situation that seems to be emerging in Latin America 
again. As Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1997) argue, secu-
ritization is a situation where an issue is perceived as an 
existential threat and therefore merits reactions that are 
outside the normal bounds of political procedure. For this 
reason, it is understandable to see why fear of crime leads 
many to reject existing political arrangements and support 
military coups to deal with it (Casas-Zamora, 2013:45). We 
do not argue that the mechanisms linking crime and dem-
ocratic attitudes are rooted exclusively in emotional and 
social-psychological responses, for we acknowledge that 
standard performance-based considerations also apply. But 
the role of performance evaluations on attitudinal support 
for democracy has been widely explored. We stress here 
the emotional mechanisms that crime also triggers. If fear 
of crime were processed exclusively as an indicator of the 
performance of the political system, its impact on support 
for democracy would be found across countries. However, 
and as we show here, fear of crime has a negative impact 
on support for democracy only in countries with significant 
levels of individual crime victimization and not in those 
with very low levels of it.
While we stress here an emotional mechanism to under-
stand the relationship between citizen insecurity and sup-
port for democracy, there are some alternative explanations 
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that need to be acknowledged. In the social psychological 
tradition, crime victimization can lead people to reject de-
mocracy because it increases their perception of threat, and 
this makes people more susceptible to endorse authoritar-
ian alternatives. For instance, Stenner (2005:8) argues that 
antidemocratic predispositions can be triggered by “chang-
ing conditions of threat,” especially when they affect peo-
ple’s “normative order.” But she also concludes that authori-
tarianism seems to be a lasting personality trait (Stenner, 
2005:326). In some cases, authoritarian reactions are seen 
as the result of aggressiveness against deviants, against 
those who flout societal norms and conventions (Altemey-
er, 1981). Others (Inglehart, 1997) suggest that authoritar-
ian reactions are triggered by societal and cultural changes 
caused by rapid modernization and the desire to seek pre-
dictability. While these mechanisms are plausible, they re-
ly on more demanding assumptions to be operative, being 
personality traits (Altemeyer, 1981; Stenner, 2005), or swift 
societal change (Inglehart, 1997).
Alternatively, the effect of crime on support for democ-
racy can be seen as the result of performance assessments, 
not social psychological dynamics. A large body of literature 
argues that support for democracy is performance-driven 
(inter alia, Carlin and Singer, 2011; Carrión, 2008; Bratton 
and Mattes, 2001). Crime can thus trigger the rejection of 
democracy for the state’s inability to deliver security, a pub-
lic good. Crime can be a signal of system failure that may 
lead many to reject democracy. While this view can indeed 
include crime as a performance variable, doing so under-
plays the strong emotional aspects associated with crime, 
especially in contexts where crime is widespread. More-
over, if fear of crime is perceived only as a performance 
variable, then its effect on support for democracy should not 
depend on the context, i.e. on the existing levels of crime 
victimization. We show here that, indeed, the effect of fear 
on support for democracy is not statistically significant in 
countries with very low crime.
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national Contexts and the individual
Voters may look at the situation of violent crime in their 
countries, even if they were not directly affected by it, and 
assess the political regime accordingly. Alternatively, vot-
ers may be driven primarily by their direct personal expe-
rience with crime. Other national factors can affect individ-
ual levels of support for democracy. For instance, countries 
with a higher level of economic development may exhib-
it more content citizens because they believe democracy is 
delivering prosperity. Residents in poorer countries, on the 
other hand, may have a lesser attachment to a political re-
gime that is exhibiting serious performance limitations. This 
is consistent with modernization theory and its variants 
(Inglehart, 1997) that suggest a nation’s level of economic 
development is associated with democracy. GDP per cap-
ita is likely also an indicator of state strength so this vari-
able sheds some light on the way to which a greater state 
presence is associated with higher levels of support for de-
mocracy. The multilevel model we develop to examine the 
impact of crime on democracy includes country-level vari-
ables that try to control for the severity of crime (measured 
as homicide rates present in 2012) and level of economic 
development in 2012 (measured as Growth Domestic Prod-
uct per capita in US dollars).
Control Variables: political efficacy, interpersonal Trust, 
economic, and political performance
In addition to the standard socio-demographic controls (age, 
education, gender, interest in politics), research on mass 
attitudes towards democracy offers a series of factors that 
need to be controlled for when one studies the impact of 
crime on this support. Political efficacy measures the degree 
to which citizens feel that they understand and have influ-
ence over the political process. The literature (Balch, 1974) 
distinguishes between “internal efficacy” (ability to under-
stand politics) and “external efficacy” (a sense that people 
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in government care about what citizens think). We hypoth-
esize that people who exhibit higher levels of political effi-
cacy, both internal and external, will be more likely to sup-
port democracy.7 
Another factor that is frequently offered in the literature 
as a predictor of this support is interpersonal trust. In the 
social capital tradition (Putnam, 1993), interpersonal trust 
is seen as an emerging property of social systems that en-
joy widespread associational networks. Newton (2001) and 
Inglehart (2003) find that countries with higher levels of in-
terpersonal trust tend to have higher levels of support for 
democracy. We control for this factor accordingly.8
To account for the large body of work which argues that 
citizens’ attitudes and preferences are largely determined 
by rational calculations, i.e. economic concerns (Duch and 
Stevenson, 2008; Fiorina, 1981; Kiewit, 1983; Lewis-Beck, 
1988), we control for economic voting. In the standard for-
mulation, voters make political choices driven by assess-
ments of the economy, granting support when they are sat-
isfied with economic conditions but withdrawing it when 
they find economy sour. Some argue that what matters to 
voters is whether their personal economy (or the country’s 
economy) is improving in relation to the immediate past, in 
what is described as “retrospective voting” (Fiorina, 1981). 
An additional debate developed in relation to the focus of 
attention of economic assessments. For some, the impor-
tant variable to consider was the condition of the country’s 
economy (“sociotropic voting”) not the individual’s pocket-
book (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981). Thus, we control for retro-
7 We measure the respondent’s sense of efficacy by using two 7-point scale 
questions. Internal efficacy: “You feel that you understand the most impor-
tant political issues of this country.” External efficacy: “Those who govern 
this country are interested in what people like you think.” Responses were 
rescaled to vary from 0 to 100. 
8 Interpersonal trust is measured by a 7-point scale question that asks agree-
ment with the following statement: “And speaking of the people from around 
here, would you say that people in this community are very trustworthy, 
somewhat trustworthy, not very trustworthy or untrustworthy...?” Responses 
were rescaled to vary from 0 to 100.
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spective and current assessments of the national economy 
and the respondent’s personal economic situation.9
data and research design
To reiterate, we test whether self-reported crime victimiza-
tion and fear of crime (measured by feelings of insecurity) 
affect attitudinal support for democracy. Given that previous 
research shows some inconsistent results regarding this re-
lationship, we test our models using two dependent vari-
ables, which offer alternative ways of measuring endorse-
ment of democracy. The first variable measures agreement 
with its Churchillian definition: 
Support for democracy (SFD). This is a 7-point scale 
question that probes the respondent’s level of agreement 
with the following statement: “Changing the subject again, 
democracy may have problems, but it is better than any 
other form of government. To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with this statement?” The responses were res-
caled to range from 0 (no support) to 100 (high support for 
democracy).
The second dependent variable measures support for 
democracy by asking respondents to make a regime choice. 
We refer to this second way of measuring endorsement of 
democracy as “regime preference for democracy.” 
Regime preference for democracy (RPD). To measure re-
gime choice we use the following question: “Now changing 
the subject… Which of the following statements do you agree 
with the most: (1) For people like me it doesn’t matter wheth-
er a government is democratic or non-democratic, OR (2) De-
9 These questions were worded as follows: (1) How would you describe the 
country’s economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, nei-
ther good nor bad, bad or very bad? (2) Do you think that the country’s current 
economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months 
ago? (3) How would you describe your overall economic situation? Would you 
say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad? (4) Do 
you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse 
than it was 12 months ago? Responses were recoded and rescaled so that 
they would vary from 0 (negative assessments) to 100 (positive assessments).
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mocracy is preferable to any other form of government, OR 
(3) Under some circumstances an authoritarian government 
may be preferable to a democratic one.” The variable was 
recoded so that responses will range from the authoritarian 
choice (“under some circumstances an authoritarian gov-
ernment may be preferable...”) to the democratic one (“de-
mocracy is preferable…”). The neutral choice (“for people 
like me…”) was placed between these two regime alterna-
tives.
The Pearson correlation coefficient of these two vari-
ables is .20 (p. <.0001). This means that while they are pos-
itively correlated, the correlation is weak. This implies that 
they are tapping different dimensions of support for democ-
racy, which is understandable given the different wording 
of the choices. Thus, we find it appropriate to use both to 
see whether crime and fear of crime affect endorsement of 
democracy in a consistent manner, regardless of the way 
we measure support for democracy. 
To measure the impact of crime on democratic atti-
tudes we use two variables. The first is individually report-
ed crime victimization. The respondents were asked the fol-
lowing: “Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim 
of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have 
you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, black-
mail, extortion, violent threats or any other type of crime in 
the past 12 months?” Those who answered affirmatively 
were assigned a score of one, and zero otherwise. The sec-
ond crime-related variable is fear of crime. We measured 
fear by using the proxy variable of perception or feelings 
of insecurity, for which we use a 7-point scale question: 
“Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and think-
ing of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you 
feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very 
unsafe?” The responses were rescaled so that the resulting 
scale would range from 0 (very little fear of crime) to 100 
(very high fear of crime). We acknowledge that this proxy 
is only an approximation to measuring fear of crime. But 
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we contend that while this question is strictly asking about 
feelings of insecurity and not emotions, it is difficult to ar-
gue that an affective reaction (in this case, feeling unsafe) 
is not an emotional response. In standard accounts of emo-
tions and politics, feelings are indeed treated as emotions 
(see Marcus, 2003). Again, we admit this question could 
also be measuring performance assessments in addition 
to emotions caused by crime, but we want to focus on the 
emotional aspects that this question clearly probes. For the 
analysis that follows, all predictors—with the exception of 
the dichotomous variables—are centered in relation to their 
countries’ means. We do so because it has been shown to 
significantly reduce the risk of multicollinearity in multilev-
el designs (Bickel, 2007; Paccagnella, 2006), and to simpli-
fy the interpretations of the results. 
We develop four models to test the influence of crime 
on attitudes towards democracy, each model representing 
a different combination of the control variables. We test the 
same models with the two different versions of our depen-
dent variable. Table 1 reports the results for the “support 
for democracy” variable (agreement with its Churchillian 
definition). The first model is our baseline model because 
it only includes the country-level effects, the crime vari-
ables, interpersonal trust, feelings of political efficacy, and 
sociodemographic variables (age, education, gender, and 
degree of interest in politics).10 Model 2 adds variables that 
are associated with the “economic voting” literature: retro-
spective and current assessments of the country’s and the 
respondent’s economic situation. Model 3 removes the eco-
nomic voting variables and replaces them with predictors 
that tap political performance: trust in the judiciary and 
10 Education is measured by the total number of years of formal schooling. 
Women are assigned a score of one, and zero for men. Interest in politics is 
measured by asking respondents “How much interest do you have in poli-
tics: a lot, some, little or none.” As in previous cases, the answers were res-
caled to range from 0 to 100, with the highest score denoting strong interest 
in politics.
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Congress (or Parliament).11 We also test a fully saturated 
model, with the inclusion of all predictors. Given that we 
have detected wording effects in the literature (varying re-
sults depending upon how support for democracy is mea-
sured) we test all these models with a different formulation 
of our dependent variable, a regime preference for democ-
racy (Table 2).
Country-level factors that affect support for democracy 
may also interact with our main independent crime-related 
variables. For instance, it is possible that the pernicious ef-
fects of crime on democracy would be higher in countries 
with low levels of economic development or high homicide 
rates. Accordingly, we tested a number of cross-level in-
teractions (individual crime victimization and fear of crime 
were interacted with each country’s GDP per capita and ho-
micide rate), but none of them emerged as statistically sig-
nificant. Therefore we decided to drop them from subse-
quent analysis. 
Given that our data come from 23 different countries, 
and thus have a hierarchical structure where respondents 
are nested within countries, multilevel analysis is our esti-
mation of choice. Multilevel analysis allows predicting in-
dividual support for democracy adjusted for country differ-
ences, as well as predicting the national effects on support 
for democracy controlled by individual characteristics. Indi-
vidual support for democracy in this estimation strategy is 
the combination of fixed effects (the covariates at both the 
individual and country level) and random effects from coun-
try to country. We estimate SFD using multilevel mixed-ef-
fects linear regression but we employ multilevel mixed-ef-
fect ordinal logistic regression to estimate RFD, given that it 
is a dependent variable with only three ordered categories. 
Table 1 offers the estimates of Support for Democracy (SFD) 
11 Trust in the judiciary and Trust in Congress (or Parliament) are measured by 
two 7-point scale questions: “To what extent do you trust the justice system?” 
and “To what extent do you trust the National Congress? [or Parliament]” Re-
sponses were rescaled to range from 0 (low trust) to 100 (high trust).
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and Table 2 displays the results of the estimation for Re-
gime Preference for Democracy (RPD).
results and discussion
Let’s discuss the estimates for SFD first (Table 1). The inter-
cept or constant for SFD is equal to 70.40 (model 1). This 
is the expected value of the mean of SFD when all our in-
dependent variables are set equal to their country means. 
Substantively, this value indicates that, on average, there 
is a moderate to strong support for the Churchillian defini-
tion of democracy in the 23 countries examined here. The 
results suggest that there is a significant effect of violent 
crime on levels of SFD. Respondents that reside in countries 
with higher rates of homicides tend to have a lower sup-
port for democracy than residents of less violent countries: 
an additional unit above the regional mean of rate of homi-
cides reduces support for democracy by .119 points (model 
1). However, individual crime victimization does not have 
a significant impact in the levels of SFD, and in the only 
case that it emerges as significant at the .05 level or best, 
it appears with the wrong sign. Fear of crime, on the other 
hand, consistently emerges as a negative influence on SFD, 
with one unit above the country mean depressing this sup-
port by 1.086 points (model 1). Another way of looking at 
this relationship is by examining how the predicted values 
of support for democracy (based on model 1 of Table 1) plot 
against feelings of insecurity (Figure 1). As it can be seen, 
the predicted value of this support is almost 73 (on the 0-
100 scale) for those who feel safe in their neighborhoods 
but only around 68 for those who declare to feel “very un-
safe” in their neighborhoods.
As the modernization theory (Inglehart, 1997) would su-
ggest, a country’s level of economic development is positi-
vely related to support for democracy. The effect, granted, is 
small (.001) but it is still significant in all of the models. GDP 
per capita is likely associated with greater state capacity and 
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better social programs, so we infer that the abilities of the-
se high-income countries “to deliver the goods” account for 
their citizens’ greater endorsement of democracy than those 
who reside in low-income countries, which more likely ex-
hibit weaker states and less comprehensive social programs. 
Model 2 tests the impact of economic voting variables on 
SFD, and the evidence offers some partial support for this 
view. Respondents who have retrospective evaluations of 
the economy that are above their country’s means (both so-
ciotropic and egotistical) tend to display greater levels of 
support for democracy than those whose assessments are 
below the mean. Assessment of current conditions are, 
however, not significant or emerge with the wrong sign. In 
terms of the impact of political performance, we find strong 
and consistent support for the view that trust in institutions 
(in this case the judiciary and Congress) increases support 
for democracy (model 3). In a similar vein, feelings of in-
ternal efficacy are consistently associated with greater en-
dorsement of democracy, meaning that people who score 
above their country’s means in the feeling that they un-
derstand the most important political issues of the moment 
have higher scores in the scale of support for democracy 
(feeling of external efficacy is significant in only two of the 
models). Finally, all the socio-demographic variables, with 
exception of gender, are statistically significant and in the 
expected direction. 
Table 1. 
determinants of Support for democracy in latin america
 1. Fixed Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Full
Model
Country Level
Homicide rate -.119*(.060)
-.118*
(.060)
-.117*
(.061)
-.117*
(.060)
GDP per capita .001***(.000)
.001***
(.000)
.001***
(.000)
.001***
(.000)
Individual Level
Crime victimization .574
(.398)
.533
(.403)
.779**
(.402)
.730
(.406)
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Fear of crime -1.086***(.187)
-1.05***
(.190)
-.936***
(.189)
-.931***
(.192)
Trust in the 
judiciary
.049***
(.006)
.052***
(.006)
Trust in Congress -.026***
(.006)
.025***
(.006)
Evaluation of 
country’s current 
economic situation
-.003
(.008)
-.010
(.008)
Retrospective 
evaluation of 
country’s economic 
situation
.018***
(.005)
.016**
(.005)
Evaluation of 
personal current 
economic situation
-.031***
(.009)
-.035***
(.009)
Retrospective 
evaluation of 
personal economic 
situation
.019***
(.005)
.015**
(.005)
External efficacy .368***(.085)
.339***
(.088)
.024
(.091)
.024
(.093)
Internal efficacy 2.788***
(.094)
2.806***
(0.95) 2.784***
2.80
(.096)
Interpersonal trust .053***(.005)
.053***
(.006)
.048***
(.006)
.049***
(.006)
Interest in politics .022***(.005)
.021***
(.005)
.019***
(.005)
.019***
(.005)
Age .143***
(.010)
.149***
(.010)
.144***
(.010)
.147***
(.011)
Education .376***
(.040)
.399***
(.041)
.412***
(.041)
.438***
(.041)
Women .529
(.305)
-.588
(.309)
.295
(.308)
-.334
(.312)
Constant 70.371***
(1.17)
70.320***
(1.160)
70.322***
(1.177)
70.298***
(1.167)
l1. Random Effects
Estimate
(Std. Error)
Estimate
(Std. Error)
Estimate
(Std. Error)
Estimate
(Std. Error)
Country Variance 
(Constant)
30.170***
(9.052)
29.587***
(8.884)
30.512***
(9.154)
29.910***
(8.981)
Individual Variance 
(Residual)
723.580***
(5.732)
721.191***
(5.800)
716.023***
(5.761)
713.586***
(5.819)
Log Restricted-
Likelihood -150258.3 -145980.76 -145530.93 -141634.49
N. of cases (N. of 
countries) 31885(23) 30988(23) 30916(23) 30099(23)
p-values *< .05; **<.01; ***<.001. Entries are multilevel mixed-effects linear regres-
sion coefficients.
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Figure 1.  
Fear of Crime and Support for Churchillian definition  
of democracy (predicted Values), 2012 
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We now move to examine the determinants of regime pref-
erence for democracy (Table 2 and Figure 2). We use the 
same predictors and models employed to estimate SFD. The 
results confirm the powerful impact of emotions generated 
by the crime wave in Latin America on attitudes towards 
democracy. As was the case with SFD, fear of crime emerg-
es as a consistent predictor of regime choice in every single 
model. If we compute the predicted probabilities of select-
ing the democratic option (“democracy is preferable”) when 
all the other predictor variables are held at their means 
(based on results of Table 2, model 1), and we plot them 
against fear of crime (feelings of insecurity), we can clear-
ly see that the greater the respondent’s fear of crime, the 
lesser the probability of him/her selecting the democratic 
choice (Figure 2).
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Table 2. 
determinants of regime preference for democracy 
 in latin america
Fixed Effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Full
Model
Country Level
Homicide rate .004***
(.000)
-.004***
(.000)
-.005***
(.001)
-.000***
(.001)
GDP per capita .000***(.000)
.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
.001
(.000)
Individual Level
Crime victimization -.121***(.034)
-.118***
(.035)
-.106**
(.035)
-.089*
(.035)
Fear of crime -.062***
(.017)
-.057***
(.017)
-.058***
(.017)
-.056***
(.017)
Trust in the  
judiciary
.002**
(.001)
.001**
(.000)
Trust in Congress .001**(.000)
.001*
(.000)
Evaluation of country’s 
current economic  
situation
.003***
(.001)
.002**
(.001)
Retrospective evaluation 
of country’s economic 
situation
.001
(.000)
.001
(.000)
Evaluation of 
personal current  
economic situation
.000
(.001)
.000
(.000)
Retrospective evaluation 
of personal economic  
situation
-.000
(.000)
-.000
(.000)
External efficacy -.017*(.008)
-.024**
(.008)
-.029***
(.008)
-.034***
(.008)
Internal efficacy .035***
(.008)
.037***
(.009)
.034***
(.009)
.035***
(.009)
Interpersonal trust .004***(.001)
.004***
(.000)
.004***
(.000)
.003***
(.001)
Interest in politics .001(.000)
.000
(.000)
.001
(.000)
.000
(.000)
Age .014***(.001)
.014***
(.001)
.014***
(.001)
.015***
(.001)
Education .032***(.004)
.033***
(.004)
.034***
(.004)
.035***
(.004)
Women -.015
(.027)
-.015
(.028)
-.029
(.028)
-.029
(.000)
Intercept 1 -1.979***(.024)
-1.98***
(.026)
-2.122***
(.024)
-2.168***
(.028)
Intercept 2 -1.091***(.021)
-1.006***
(.023)
-1.242***
(.021)
-1.287***
(.025)
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Country Variance  
(Constant) .095***(.007)
.132***
(.010)
.121***
(.009)
.078***
(.006)
Log Restricted-Likeli-
hood -21503.665 -20920.578 -20849.45 -20316.798
N. of cases (N. of  
countries) 31415(23) 30543(23) 30429(23) 29631(23)
p-values *< .05; **<.01; ***<.001. Entries are multilevel ordinal logistic regression 
coefficients.
Figure 2. Fear of Crime and regime preference for democracy 
(predicted probabilities), 2012
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In a similar vein and unlike what we found when we mod-
eled support for the Churchillian definition of democracy, 
we find that crime victimization has a consistent impact on 
regime choice. People who acknowledge to have been vic-
tims of a crime in the year previous to the survey exhibit a 
lower probability of selecting democracy than those who 
were not victims. This is true in all the estimated models. 
This confirms that the impact of crime victimization on the 
endorsement of democracy is highly dependent on the way 
we choose to measure support for democracy. This explains 
the inconsistencies found in previous studies of this asso-
ciation.
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Why is it that the effect of self-reported crime victim-
ization on support for democracy depends on the way we 
measure this support? One possible explanation is that SFD, 
unlike RPD, does not ask the respondent to make a clear 
comparison between democracy and authoritarianism. 
Therefore, fearful citizens might not feel necessarily in-
clined to disagree that democracy is better than other, un-
named, forms of government, which is what SFD does. By 
contrast, when given the specific question whether under 
some circumstances an authoritarian government may be 
preferable to democracy (which is what RFD asks), fearful 
citizens might feel that, indeed, generalized crime is one of 
those circumstances that make authoritarianism more ac-
ceptable. 
There are some other important differences in the be-
havior of the control variables when predicting RPD. For 
instance, unlike what we found in SFD, economic voting 
seems to have very little influence on regime choice. The 
only variable that emerges as significant is the evaluation 
of the country’s current economic situation. The other im-
portant difference is that levels of interest in politics have 
no impact on regime choice, whereas it was a significant 
predictor of support for the Churchillian definition of de-
mocracy. Similarly, the coefficients associated with exter-
nal efficacy, while significant, emerge with the wrong sign. 
Finally, it is worth noting that age, education, and interper-
sonal trust are again consistent predictors of the endorse-
ment of democracy, as they were for the Churchillian defi-
nition of democracy.
individual and local effects on Fear of Crime
A comparative analysis of Tables 1 and 2 reveals that the 
impact of individual crime victimization on democratic at-
titudes is sensitive to wording effects. But regardless of the 
way we measure support for democracy, fear of crime (mea-
sured by the proxy of feelings of insecurity) is a consistent 
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predictor of this attitude. Based on these findings, one could 
conclude that actual crime victimization is not that impor-
tant when examining people’s attitudes towards democra-
cy. But this view would be mistaken, as we show below.
There is an extensive literature on fear of crime in Latin 
America (Casas-Zamora, 2013; Dammert and Malone, 2006; 
Dammert, 2012; Luengas and Ruprah, 2008). This fear, in-
deed, seems to have reached epidemic proportions. Casas-
Zamora (2013:31) reports that, in 2010, “one third of Latin 
Americans said they were always or almost always con-
cerned about the possibility of being a victim of a violent 
crime, with 56% saying that are sometimes or only occa-
sionally concerned.” Dammert (2012) contends that fear of 
crime is driven by an array of factors, including econom-
ic modernization, urban segregation, institutional trust, and 
authoritarian discourses, at least in the Chilean case. This 
fear is indeed driven by a host of factors and actual crime 
victimization is a significant cause of it (Garofalo, 1979; Rot-
ker, 2002; Skogan, 1987), but not the only one. Again, our 
intention is not to argue that fear of crime is driven exclu-
sively or even primarily by crime victimization, only that the 
latter is a significant predictor of the former, and therefore 
that crime victimization is an important factor affecting atti-
tudes towards democracy. 
Table 3 reports the multilevel mixed-effects analysis 
of the predictors of fear of crime (measured as feelings of 
insecurity). We include in this table the two country-lev-
el variables used in previous tables, to control for nation-
al contexts. Our four main predictors of interest are indi-
vidual crime victimization, a measure of the rate of crime 
victimization in the respondent’s municipality (city) of 
residence,12 satisfaction with the way democracy is work-
12 This rate was determined by computing the percent of individuals who were 
victims of crime in a given municipality (city) of residence. This rate ranges 
from 0 (no resident was victim of a crime in the given municipality) to 1 (all res-
idents in the municipality were victims of a crime). About 7% of the sample re-
sides in municipalities where no respondent reported being a victim of crime. 
About 30% of the sample lives in municipalities (cities) where between 10% 
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ing in the country, and support for the political system.13 
We include some sociodemographic factors as controls: the 
size of the town where the respondent resides (rural area, 
small, medium, large, and national capital), degree of inter-
est in politics (to measure the impact of awareness of na-
tional events), age, education, and gender. 
What is striking in the results reported in Table 3 is that 
the national rates of homicide do not have a statistically sig-
nificant impact on individual levels of feelings of insecu-
rity. This finding can be explained by a couple of reasons. 
First, homicide rates may be quite an unreliable indicator 
of violent crime as they may not uniformly or consistently 
be reported in all countries. Second, homicides rates may 
be determined by violent crime that is largely localized in 
few areas, such as city capitals or regions prone to violence, 
such as Ciudad Juarez in Mexico, and therefore do not gen-
erate fear across the nation in a uniform way. Finally, peo-
ple may be more influenced by crime, even if it is petty 
crime, if it happens directly to them or in areas that are geo-
graphically very close to them, rather than by violent and 
lethal crime that occurs in more distant places. Indeed, we 
find here that there is a very important effect of self-report-
ed crime victimization (both individual and local) on fear of 
crime. When we plot the predicted values of fear of crime 
against the degree of crime victimization in the municipality 
of residence and gender (Figure 3), we find that, first, wom-
en exhibit greater levels of fear of crime than men and, sec-
and 20% of the residents were victims of crime. Only 1% of the sample resides 
in municipalities where 50% or more of respondents were victims of a crime. 
The correlation between individual crime and local crime is .3 (p. <.001). 
13 Support for the political system is a composite index based on the following 
7-point scale questions that ask the extent to which the respondent “supports 
the political institutions of [country]”, thinks “that citizens’ basic rights are 
well protected by the political system”, “feel proud of living under the politi-
cal system”, and thinks “that one should support the political system.” Satis-
faction with democracy was measured by asking the following question: “In 
general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or 
very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in [country]”. The answers 
were recoded so that they would go from very dissatisfied to very satisfied. 
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ond, fear of crime increases as the rate of crime in the mu-
nicipality goes up. Figure 3 shows that women residing in 
municipalities that reported no crime victimization score 34 
in the 0-100 scale of feelings of insecurity, whereas wom-
en residing in localities where 90% of residents reported to 
have been victims of crime score 57 in the same scale (val-
ues for men are 32 and 57, respectively). The results of Ta-
ble 3 also show that fear of crime is driven by performance 
considerations. People who are satisfied with the way de-
mocracy works in their country and who have a greater 
degree of support for the political system have less fear of 
crime than those who are politically discontent. We find al-
so that fear of crime is lower among the more educated. 
Table 3. 
determinants of Fear of Crime in latin america, 2012
Fixed Effects Coefficient
Standard 
Error
Country Level
Homicide rate -.024 .047
GDP per capita -.000 .000
Individual level
System Support -.084*** .010
Satisfaction with the Way Democracy Works -.107*** .009
Individual Crime Victimization 9.647*** .530
Percent of Crime Victimization in Municipality 22.708*** 2.220
Size of Town 2.153*** .146
Interest in Politics .004 .006
Age -.018 .013
Education -.291*** .053
Women 2.411*** .404
Constant 41.607*** 2.449
Random Effects Estimate Std. Error
Country Variance (Constant) 17.929*** 5.624
Individual Variance (Residual) 746.686*** 7.673
Log Restricted-Likelihood -89672.385
N. of cases (N. of countries) 18964(23)
p-values *< .05; **<.01; ***<.001. Entries are multilevel mixed-effects linear 
regression.
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Figure 3. 
Fear of Crime by local Crime Victimization and Gender  
in latin america, 2012
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Fear of Crime and Support for democracy  
in Countries with high and low Crime
Following the existing literature (Brader, 2011; Cassino and 
Lodge, 2007; Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, 2000; Mar-
cus, MacKuen, and Neuman, 2011) we argue at the outset 
that threatening conditions arouse fear and anxiety and 
trigger people’s surveillance system. This makes them more 
attentive to the environment and more prone to give great-
er weight to negative information. As Nardulli and Kuklin-
ski (2007:316) argue, anxiety also generates a disposition to 
embrace political change. We believe that people who are 
fearful of crime would blame the existing political regime, 
whether democratic or not. In the case of Latin America, we 
have shown that feelings of insecurity depress support for 
democracy, regardless of how this support is measured. We 
also show that this fear is driven, among other factors, by 
existing levels of self-reported crime victimization. Thus, it 
is plausible to hypothesize that in countries with very low 
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levels of crime victimization, people will not get their sur-
veillance system activated, and therefore they will not uti-
lize fear of crime as new information that might lead them 
to reject democracy. It is only in countries with significant 
levels of crime where the surveillance system will be ac-
tivated and fear of crime will be politicized, i.e. will lead 
people to reject the existing political arrangement. We as-
sess this hypothesis in this section.
In our previous analyses, we do not find a significant in-
teraction effect between a country’s homicide rate and fear 
of crime on support for democracy. However, this does not 
mean that the impact of fear of crime on levels of support 
for democracy is similar across countries. When we select 
countries based on their rates of self-reported individual 
crime victimization, we find that, as expected, fear of crime 
is an insignificant predictor of support for democracy in 
countries that exhibit very low levels of crime victimization 
(where individual crime victimization is less than 10%), but 
significant in countries with both middling and very high 
levels of self-reported crime victimization. 
Table 4 reports the results of this analysis. We select 
three groups of countries using the self-reported levels of 
crime victimization found in the 2012 round of the Barom-
eter of the Americas. We selected the countries with the 
highest levels of crime victimization (the top six, with rates 
ranging from 21.3% to 28.1%) and the lowest level of it (the 
bottom three, ranging from 6.9% to 8.5%). As comparison, 
we selected 5 countries with middling rates of self-report-
ed crime victimization (rates ranging from 17.4% to 19.4%). 
We were not seeking to divide up the countries proportion-
ally. We wanted to contrast countries with the lowest crime 
rates with those that have significantly higher rates.14 The 
14 We use the lowest three countries because they conform a “natural” grouping. 
The 2012 Barometer of the Americas survey reveals that Panama is the coun-
try with the lowest percent of respondents being victims of a crime (6.9%), fol-
lowed by Guyana (8%) and Jamaica (8.5%). The next country in terms of vic-
timization is Nicaragua, which at 13.5% is almost twice as high as Panama’s.
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results, reported in Table 4, confirm the expectation that 
fear of crime is not a significant predictor of attitudes to-
wards democracy in low-crime countries. By contrast, fear 
of crime does emerge as a significant predictor of SFD and 
RPD in countries with middling and high levels of self-re-
ported crime victimization. If fear of crime was measuring 
only performance assessments, then this finding is difficult 
to explain. Why would fear of crime not be used as infor-
mation to assess regime preferences in countries with very 
low levels of crime? And why would fear of crime affect lev-
els of support for democracy in countries such as Uruguay 
and Argentina—with high levels of self-reported crime but 
also among the top three countries in the region in terms 
of degree of satisfaction with the way democracy is work-
ing? If fear of crime is seen as an emotional response, then 
this finding becomes intelligible. According to the theory of 
affective intelligence, this fear would have political conse-
quences only when people’s surveillance system is activat-
ed, i.e. when crime has reached a certain threshold. This is 
what our analysis suggests.
Table 4.  
Support for democracy by levels of Crime Victimization
High Levels of Crime 
Victimization
Middling Levels of  
Crime Victimization
Very Low Levels of 
Crime Victimization
SFD RPD SFD RPG SFD RPD
Crime  
victimization
-.332
(.623)
-.100
(.059)
-.317
(.924)
-.047
(.079)
4.50**
(1.614)
-.086
(.149)
Fear of crime -1.226***
(.349)
-.080**
(.034)
-.854*
(.423)
-.097**
(.002)
-1.126
(.669)
.027
(.058)
External  
efficacy
1.158***
(.166)
-.015
(.016)
.259
(.194)
-.003
(.017)
.463
(.290)
-.011
(.025)
Internal  
efficacy
2.392***
(.198)
.020
(.018)
3.405***
(.233)
.001
(.018)
2.955***
(.314)
.069**
(.025)
Interpersonal 
trust
.060***
(.010)
.005***
(.000)
.031**
(.013)
.002
(.001)
.099***
(.019)
.003
(.002)
Interest in 
politics
.024**
(.009)
.002
(.001)
-.000
(.012)
-.001
(.001)
.002
(.016)
-.003
(.001)
Age .163***
(.017)
.015***
(.002)
.145***
(.023)
.020***
(.002)
.115***
(.033)
.011***
(.003)
Education .522***
(.067)
.039***
(.007)
.397***
(.089)
.033***
(.007)
.449**
(.161)
.044***
(.014)
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Women 1.48**
(.527)
-.014
(.051)
.435
(.714)
-.077
(.063)
-.164
(.943)
-.081
(.081)
Constant 82.834***
(.695)
65.347***
(.867)
73.705***
(.981)
Intercept 1 -2.32***
(.081)
-1.812***
(.082)
-2.445***
(.088)
Intercept 2 -1.55***(.077)
-.929***
(.075)
-1.425***
(.080)
R-squared 
(Pseudo R2) 0.178 (0.026) 0.178 (0.051) 0.057 (0.014)
N. of cases 9412 9169 6646 6546 3762 3790
p-values *< .05; **<.01; ***<.001. High crime countries: crime victimization ra-
tes range from 21.3% to 28.1% (Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, and 
Ecuador). Low crime countries: crime victimization rates range from 6.9% to 
8.5% (Panama, Guyana, and Jamaica). Middling levels of crime: crime victimi-
zation rates range from 17.4% to 19.4% (El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Do-
minican Republic, and Venezuela). Entries for Support for Democracy (SFD) are 
fixed-effects linear regression coefficients with robust standard errors. Entries 
for Regime Preference for Democracy (RPD) are fixed-effects ordinal logistic co-
efficients with robust standard errors. Dummy variables for countries are omit-
ted from the table but were included in the statistical analysis.
Concluding Thoughts
The early literature on mass support for democracy (Bratton 
and Mattes, 2001; Gibson, 1996; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, 
2003; Mishler and Rose, 1996) did not include crime-re-
lated variables in their models. This absence reflected low 
levels of crime existing at the time. Today it is highly prob-
lematic to study attitudes towards democracy without tak-
ing into account crime and the powerful emotions it elicits. 
We do not dispute that crime can be seen as a performance 
failure and affect citizen support for democracy accordingly. 
But we argue that it is erroneous to discount the emotion-
al response that feelings of insecurity generate. Our study 
does not seek to reject the idea that performance consider-
ations matter. This is a topic that has been studied and we 
believe it is largely settled. Our interest here is in highlight-
ing the emotional dynamics that crime produces and how 
they influence support for democracy. Following the litera-
ture on affective intelligence, we argue that fear is a consis-
tent predictor of attitudes towards democracy, but only in 
REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE OPINIÓN PÚBLICA / NÚMERO 6 43
contexts where crime victimization has crossed a threshold 
(in the case of Latin America, more than ten percent of the 
adult population).
This article advances our knowledge of the field in four 
significant ways. First, we find that the impact of individu-
al crime victimization on support for democracy is sensitive 
to the way we measure this support. This explains the in-
consistencies we identify in the literature. When it is mea-
sured in agreement with its Churchillian definition, crime 
victimization is not a significant predictor. When the choice 
provided is starker (choosing between authoritarianism 
and democracy), then individual crime victimization does 
emerge as a significant predictor. Perhaps direct experience 
with crime triggers an authoritarian preference that cannot 
be detected when the respondent is simply asked to prof-
fer his/her degree of support for the idea of democracy, but 
it does when the democratic option is contrasted with the 
authoritarian one. This is an issue that merits further explo-
ration. Second, we show that regardless of how support for 
democracy is measured, fear of crime emerges as a signifi-
cant and consistent predictor of this attitude. From this we 
conclude that fear of crime has greater attitudinal impact on 
support of democracy than crime victimization. Third, we 
argue that while crime victimization per se may fail to affect 
support for democracy in some formulations of it, crime vic-
timization (both individually and contextually, measured as 
degree of crime in the municipality of residence), is a strong 
predictor of fear and, as such, a factor that needs to be ac-
counted when assessing the impact of crime on attitudes 
towards democracy. Finally, and consistent with the affec-
tive intelligence literature, we find that crime fails to acti-
vate people’s surveillance systems in countries that exhibit 
very little levels of it (typically, less than 10 percent of indi-
vidual crime victimization).
A necessary note of caution must be highlighted. We 
have examined the role of fear of crime by using a proxy 
variable, namely feelings of insecurity caused by crime. It is 
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an imperfect measure but one that allows us to explore the 
important role that emotions play in the determination of 
regime preference. Further research on different measures 
of emotional responses to crime is necessary to further our 
knowledge of this issue. It would be important, for instance, 
to use a larger set of questions to measure a broader range 
of emotional responses, focusing not only on fear but also 
on anxiety, anger, and disgust, and see how they relate to 
support for democracy.
We have also uncovered some additional findings. We 
find evidence that countries with stronger state presence 
and lower poverty rates (which higher GDP per capita sug-
gests) tend to produce citizens who are more inclined to 
support democracy than countries with weaker states and 
higher poverty. Similarly, we find that, consistently, higher 
interpersonal trust, greater interest in politics, and higher 
trust in the judiciary and Congress increase citizen support 
for democracy.
Our results suggest that Latin American societies are 
facing a serious social issue that is already having polit-
ical repercussions. The state’s rampant failure to provide 
citizen security can lead many to endorse solutions that al-
though appearing to deliver “safety” and “security” in the 
short term may end up increasing human insecurity in the 
medium and long term. There is a scholarly debate about 
the impact of democracy on crime. A number of approach-
es argue that democratic rule can conquer crime over time. 
Although the evidence in favor of this thesis is slim (Dam-
mert, 2013; LaFree and Tseloni, 2006), Latin American de-
mocracies may not have the luxury to wait and see wheth-
er they would turn out all right “in the long term.” The 
inability of politicians to approach crime as a threat to hu-
man security and democracy—and not just as a “policing” 
problem—could have lasting consequences for the viability 
and quality of democracy in the region, for it may end up 
undermining the public support that democracies need for 
their own survival.
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Our research finds inconsistent results in relation to how 
self-reported crime victimization affects attitudinal support 
for democracy. This is an area that merits further research. 
The low correlation between support for the Churchillian 
definition of democracy and regime preference for democ-
racy suggests that democratic support is not a unidimen-
sional attitude, and therefore needs to be unpacked. In this 
study, self-reported crime victimization shows consistent 
association with lower levels of regime preference for de-
mocracy. Other studies fail to uncover this association. We 
believe that there is much work needed to settle the is-
sue. But we do find strong evidence that fear of crime low-
ers support for democracy regardless of how this support is 
measured. Future research should explore whether this fear 
has also an impact on other attitudes such as political trust, 
presidential approval, political participation, vote choice, 
and even ideological leanings. 
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